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The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social 




There is little disagreement that the past two decades have been 
characterized by a rise in the judicial enforcement of economic, social and 
cultural rights (ESCRs) in several regions of the world. As a result, there has 
been a tendency to assume that the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs and 
the attendant judicial role has been settled once and for all. However, this 
article demonstrates that an abandonment of the debate altogether would be 
fallacious. While acknowledging that the conventional concerns surrounding 
the debate have been considerably thwarted, this article proposes the need for a 
shift in focus to new issues that have surfaced in recent times. The emergence 
of a “changed landscape” for the judicial enforcement of ESCRs has arisen as a 
consequence of the development of a set of phenomena that will be outlined in 
this article. This article also argues that because this set of phenomena has a 
direct bearing on the judicial enforcement of ESCRs, each of the phenomena 
goes to the heart of the debate on the judicial role in such situations. Further, 
this article makes a case for revisiting the judicial role in the wake of this 
“changed landscape,” a task that becomes not only inevitable, but necessary as 
well. Finally, this article engages in a reconsideration of the judicial role in this 
changed context. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is incorrect to contend that the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs is 
fading away. Equally flawed is the assertion that the focus of the debate has 
remained stagnant. In fact, two legal systems in particular stand out for being 
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activist and progressive in this field: those of South Africa and India. What is 
required, therefore, is a clarification of both positions. 
Prior to the 1990s, the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs was primarily a 
theoretical one, based for the most part on mere speculation and pure 
conjecture.1 Today, however, it has become apparent that the era of 
justiciability of ESCRs has taken on real practical meaning2 and has taken root 
in domestic legal systems in several regions of the world.3 The debate has thus, 
“moved on to the point where the wisdom of allowing judges the power to 
enforce social rights is no longer seriously questioned,”4 but rather to a place, 
as this article argues, where there is growing recognition of a need for judges 
to step in so as to give full meaning to the realization of these rights.5 Hence, 
what is required is not an abandonment of the debate on the justiciability of 
these rights, but rather a shift to a new set of questions that beg our attention. 
At the outset, this article raises the question as to whether, and to what 
extent, the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs has been settled. Further, this 
article argues that analogous to the rise of judicially enforced ESCRs, the 
development of a set of phenomena is also on a rise. These phenomena include 
the emergence of a new constitutional order, as well as transnational judicial 
conversations, institutional conversations, the judicialization of politics, and 
the growing campaign arguing that freedom from poverty be considered a legal 
right. While these phenomena may be viewed as occurring parallel to the rise 
                                                            
1 ROBERTO GARGARELLA, COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW 
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 255 (2006). 
2 See generally JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (Tony Solomonides & Bertrand G. Ramcharan eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter JUDICIAL PROTECTION] 
3 Id.; GARGARELLA, supra note 1, at 255. 
4 GARGARELLA, supra note 1, at 255. 
5 S. Muralidhar, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Indian Response to the 
Justiciability Debate, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS 23 (Yash P. Ghai & Jill 
Cottrell eds., 2004) (“[T]he question to be asked is probably not whether the court should 
intervene or is capable of intervening but whether judicial intervention will enable the 
progressive realization of ESCRs”). 
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in judicial enforcement of ESCRs, this article demonstrates that they are 
actually part of the cause of this type of enforcement.  
Further, this intersectionality has refashioned the backdrop in which the 
debate has hitherto been located, and thus calls for re-examination. This article 
will not explore each of these phenomena in its entirety, but will instead 
explore some of the facets that might be considered relevant for this 
discussion. This article will then demonstrate that the altered setting of the 
debate on justiciability has led to the need to re-conceptualize the judicial role 
in terms of the enforcement of ESCRs. This article will explore how the 
current phenomena are refashioning the backdrop of the discussion on the role 
of the judiciary in enforcing ESCRs. It becomes evident that the setting is 
altered to such a significant extent as to warrant special, continued 
consideration. The article seeks to provide the basis and serve as a catalyst for 
future exploration of the subject.  
There is, however, a caveat to the article’s goal, as it does not intend to 
imply that the phenomena dealt with herein are either exhaustive or 
comprehensive. Its primary purpose is to flag the need to constantly rethink 
and revisit the debate on justiciability with fresh perspectives in the wake of 
constantly emerging developments, as they might prove to be crucial to the 
perception of the judicial role. 
The article also serves to illustrate the point that this debate is not static; 
instead, it is constantly evolving. This evolution demands vigilance in 
watching varying influences in the future. One might imagine a slight hint of 
this resonating within the work of writers who argue that “[t]he variable nature 
of the concept of justiciability, depending on the nature of the issue sought to 
be adjudicated upon as well as on the constitutional role envisaged for the 
court, defies formulation of precise standards to control judicial functioning in 
the area.”6 This statement seems to refer to “external influences” apart from the 
                                                            
6 MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 28 (1995). 
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inherent nature of the judicial system itself such as the type of issue before the 
court or the constitutional provisions prescribed. The present discussion 
utilizes this vein of thinking and seeks to build upon it by making a case for the 
inclusion of other external but relevant phenomena such as those listed above. 
Such influences impact the context in which the debate on justiciability ought 
to be viewed. 
Within the larger discussion of the implementation of ESCRs, this article 
does not intend to suggest that the judiciary be considered a panacea to the 
economic, social, and cultural ills suffered by disadvantaged and marginalized 
sections of society, but rather wishes to extend a more tempered, realistic 
proposition that judges can play a crucial role in the entire process.7 Hence, it 
contributes to an overarching view that the role of the judiciary in the 
enforcement of these rights must not be ignored or trivialized. 
The call for continuing the debate is frequently dismissed because critics say 
that there is an over-emphasis on the legal aspect8 and a detraction from what 
actually warrants attention.9 However, a continued engagement in the debate is 
justified on the basis of the need for, and benefits of, a “narrow focus” on 
justiciability. This narrow focus would be one that “helps to reveal the nature 
of ESCRs and its differences, if any, from civil and political rights, the 
modalities of enforcement of ESCRs, and the articulation of court with other 
agencies for their protection and enforcement, all of which help to uncover the 
specificity of the judicial role.”10 
There are three main objections that have been advanced in relation to the 
justiciability of ESCRs. First, there is the purported distinction between 
                                                            
7 Dennis M. Davis, Socioeconomic rights: Do they deliver the goods?, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
687 (2008); COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks 
eds., 2008). See generally GARGARELLA, supra note 1. For an assessment of impact on 
society at large, see Muralidhar, supra note 5. 
8 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT LAW POLITICS 
AND MORALS 298 (1996). 
9 Muralidhar, supra note 5, at 23. 
10 Id. 
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economic, social, and cultural rights on the one hand, and civil and political 
rights on the other. Second, there are two legitimacy concerns, namely that it 
offends democratic principles and violates the constitutional doctrine of the 
separation of powers. Third, there is a fear that judges do not have the 
capability to deal with polycentric issues that have implications for budgetary 
and policy decisions that are considered to be the prerogative of the executive 
arm of government. 
This article will examine the validity of these objections, both separately and 
together, with their respective counter-arguments. It begins with an 
examination of the latter two objections, which have been the most contentious 
of the three. Any discussion leading to the consideration of the judicial role in 
the enforcement of ESCRs would, naturally, be aborted if the questions from 
the skeptics have not been dealt with and, hence, becomes crucial to the overall 
debate. Further, as most debates on the judicial role are inextricably linked to 
these objections, it becomes necessary to examine the objections, at least 
briefly, before moving to the next question. 
The second part of the article proposes that the emergence of “a changed 
landscape” has created a new context for consideration in the debate on the 
justiciability of ESCRs. 
In the third part, the article moves on to a reconsideration of the judicial role 
in the enforcement of ESCRs in the wake of the proposed changed context. It 
does so by drawing on the discussion and arguments made in the preceding 
sections of the article while focusing on three particular aspects of the judicial 
role: 1) interpretation of the meaning of ESCRs; 2) judicial review of executive 
action; and 3) the provision of remedies. The limitations inherent in the 
judicial role in the enforcement of ESCRs, though not the main focus of the 
debate, will be flagged at relevant instances. 
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PART 1: JUSTICIABILITY—DEFYING THE SKEPTICS 
A. Concerns of Legitimacy 
1. Violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers 
The legitimacy concerns raised in connection with the judicial enforcement 
of ESCRs emanate from two sources. First, some claim that judicial 
enforcement of ESCRs encroaches into the legislative domain, thereby 
usurping the prerogative over decisions on matters involving budgetary 
implications; hence, judicial intervention in this area results in violation of the 
doctrine of separation of powers.11 
A more logical and commonsensical approach, however, would be to argue 
for a “balance of power,” which must be “maintained by judgments of political 
morality rather than formal accounts of the separation of powers.”12 But judges 
appear to be well aware of the potential danger of breaching the doctrine of 
separation of powers when enforcing ESCRs.13 This has been illustrated in 
cases such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp,14 where the Supreme Court of 
India went only so far as to require that the government serve notice before 
removing pavement hawkers, but not to the point of prescribing that the 
government make houses available for all of its citizens. This ruling is 
significant because it demonstrates how the Indian Supreme Court went only 
                                                            
11 Marius Pieterse, Coming to terms with Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights, 20 S. AFR. 
J. HUM. RTS. 383, 386–391 (2004). See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalizing Social Rights, 6 J. 
POL. PHIL. 263 (1998) [hereinafter Fabre, Constitutionalizing]; Craig Scott & Patrick 
Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?: Social Rights in a New 
South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1992). 
12 Trever R. S. Allan, Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review, 23 
OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 563, 584 (2003) [hereinafter Allan, Constitutional Dialogue]. See 
also Geraldine van Bueren, Including the Excluded: The Case for an Economic, Social and 
Cultural Human Rights Act, X PUB. L. 456 (2002).  
13 Jheelan Navish, The Enforceability of Socio-economic Rights, 12 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
146, 146–57 (2007). 
14 Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., [1986] A.I.R. 18. (India) (exploring the idea of housing as 
a social right in the case of hawkers, who, when removed from their place of abode, were 
denied the right to housing). 
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so far as to require that the government inform citizens when it was 
implementing a policy and did not go so far as to prescribe what course of 
action the government ought to take in making redress.15 Likewise, a similar 
awareness was displayed in the judgment of Soobramoney v. Minister of 
Health, Kwazulu-Natal,16 where the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted 
its reluctance “to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the 
political organs . . . whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.”17 
Such examples, however, might be neutralized by skeptics who cite other 
cases and allege that judges have “gone too far.” But it is indeed possible to 
enforce such rights without violating the doctrine of separation of powers. 18 
This argument is not weakened by the mere fact that some judges have not 
been practicing this enforcement. The judiciary is capable of acting with 
responsibility and fairness in protecting the rights of victims while not 
violating the notion of separation of powers. Further, this argument provides 
examples of the awareness that judges are capable of exercising as they seek to 
maintain sensitive balances by being activist and creative at the same time. 
Further, as in the case of Simla,19 we can once again observe the value of 
judicial involvement in enforcing ESCRs. In that case, the Indian Supreme 
Court sought to rectify the ‘mandate creep,’ the lower court had gone beyond 
what it was mandated to do. Through the hierarchical structure of the courts, 
the inherent institutional ability for higher courts to correct “wrong” decisions 
in lower courts becomes evident. This basic feature of hierarchy and appeals in 
the judicial system neatly contributes to maintaining efficiency and credibility 
of the judiciary when it seeks to enforce ESCRs. In other words, the efficacy of 
                                                            
15 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., [1985] S.C.R. 51 (India). 
16 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal, 12 B.C.L.R. 1696 (1997) (S. Afr.). 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Bermudez v. Minister of Health and Social Assistance Supreme Court of Justice, 
Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, Case No. 15.789, Decision No. 918, at 916 (July 15, 
1999); Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Med. College (Simla), 1985 A.I.R. 910, 
1985 SCR (3) 676 (India). 
19 Simla, 1985 A.I.R. 910. 
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an appeals system functions as a safeguard in the judicial process, and it 
applies equally to the adjudication of all legal cases, and ESCRs are no 
exception. Below, this article will demonstrate the weakness in skeptics’ 
arguments that there is an overly expansive application of power in emerging 
phenomena such as the principle of constitutional dialogue. 
2. The Democratic Objection 
The second concern frequently voiced over legitimacy springs from the 
claim that it is “counter-majoritarian,” in that judicial enforcement of ESCRs 
takes away from the elected members of government and transfers to the 
judiciary, an unelected body, the task of making challenging decisions on 
competing claims regarding resource allocation. The decisions are usually 
challenging, as they require choices to be made between purposes for which 
the same resource base is important. This task, some believe, is best left to the 
elected branches of the state that are either directly or indirectly accountable to 
the public.20 
While admitting that these are indeed difficult choices to make, adjudicating 
on negative rights is just as difficult.21 Civil and political rights are referred to 
as ‘negative rights’ while ESCRs are referred to as ‘positive rights’ because the 
former requires, in most cases, that the state not interfere or obstruct the 
realization of rights, whereas the latter generally requires proactive measures 
on the part of the state.22 If adjudication on negative rights is legitimized on the 
                                                            
20 Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 17; CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION: GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENT LIFE 183 (2000) [hereinafter FABRE, 
SOCIAL RIGHTS]; Pieterse, supra note 11, at 10–12; David Wiseman, The Charter and 
Poverty: Beyond Injusticiability, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 425, 443 (2001). 
21 See FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 176.  
22 See, e.g., Government of South Africa v. Grootboom (Grootboom), 11B.C.L.R. 1169 at 
[34] (2000) (holding that “there is at the very least a negative obligation placed upon the 
state and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of 
access to adequate housing); Airey v. Ireland 2 E.H.R.R. 305 (1979) (finding that the state 
had a positive duty in relation to a right to a fair trial where legal aid was deemed applicable 
to civil cases). See generally The Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights, EUROPEAN 
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basis that such rights are imperative to the protection of autonomy, so might a 
similar view be advanced with regards to ESCRs.23 In order for the autonomy 
of the citizenry to be protected, the well-being and welfare of the populace 
must also be protected. For example, when basic needs such as health care and 
housing are not met, the individual will not be able to exercise autonomy 
through an enjoyment of, among others, rights such as the freedom of 
expression and association. Hence, for meaningful fulfillment of civil and 
political rights, the realization of ESCRs becomes sine qua non.24 
Do such responses then suggest that the judiciary operates in a vacuum, 
insulated from any accountability?25 This is certainly not the case. Various 
measures of accountability exist, including: transparency facilitated by public 
observation of hearings; the requirement of judges to explain and justify their 
decisions; the appointment of judges through a formal, credible process; and 
utilization of the doctrine of binding precedent.26 
Moreover, this concern reflects what some contend are varying definitions 
of the concept of democracy. “The crowning proof of democracy in our times 
is the growing acceptance and enforcement of the idea that democracy is not 
the same thing as majority rule; in a real democracy minorities possess legal 
protections in the form of a written constitution, which even a democratically 
elected assembly cannot change.”27 Because minorities are most vulnerable to 
                                                                                                                              
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW (2007) (arguing that socioeconomic rights can be expressed 
either positively or negatively). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Rajeev Dhavan, Judges and Accountability, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL 
POWER (R. Dhavan et al. eds., 1985). 
26 Pieterse, supra note 11, at 10–15; Alon Harel, Rights based Judicial Review: A 
Democratic Justification, 22 L. & PHIL. 247, 258 (2003). 
27 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004). See also GARGARELLA, supra 
note 1, at 13–14 (attempting to propose a model that is neither conservative (based on 
Alexander Hamilton and Justice Marshall) nor the progressive view of those like Michael 
Walzer, but rather one that is better suited to judicial enforcement by drawing on E. Goodin’s 
theory of deliberative democracy); Pieterse, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that “judicial review 
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violations of their ESCRs, legal protection and the subsequent judicial 
enforcement can go a long way in effectuating their rights. Thus, one might 
argue that judicial review fulfills rather than frustrates the notion of democracy 
through the protection of minority groups that lack political power and voice.28 
Furthermore, the judiciary fulfills accountability by arriving at reasoned 
decisions.29 Moreover, the judicial function can be defended on account of the 
fact that it serves as a guardian of a process that provides space for the 
democratic participation of citizens to challenge injustices that have resulted 
from a violation of rights, as opposed to being seen as an institution which 
makes substantive decisions concerning the lives of members of the public.30 
Finally, the growing trends of, inter alia, transnational judicial 
conversations, the “constitutionalization” of ESCRs, and the process of 
constitutional dialogue have all further strengthened the legitimacy of a 
judicial role in the realization of ESCRs (see infra Part II). 
B. Concerns of Competence 
Concerns over judicial competence in adjudicating ESCRs have been 
expressed at several levels. Among others, the primary claim is that the 
judiciary is ill-equipped and lacks the technical know-how to: first, make 
decisions that have government budgetary implications and involve resource 
allocations;31 second, to take decisions that involve competing policy 
choices;32 third, that it lacks tools to discern violations of ESCRs; and33 fourth, 
                                                                                                                              
maybe justified where the benefits that are gained outweigh the derogation from direct 
democracy” and that this would provide a voice for the poor and be a shield from what 
Ronald Dworkin described as the “tyranny of the majority.”). 
28 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1980). 
29 See Dhavan, supra note 25. 
30 See id. 
31 Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 280 (1998). 
32 Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464, 464–74 (1992); Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-economic Rights in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA  (Mathew Chaskalson et al. eds., 1999). 
The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 763 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
that courts do not have the “systematic overview of government policy” and 
are thus ill-suited to create and enforce government programs.34 
Several responses to these concerns could significantly weaken the 
arguments. For example, a suggested solution could be to have the judges 
trained in the necessary specialist skills and enable consultation with 
independent experts such as medical practitioners, educators, or social 
scientists who would help to better frame the factual matter before the court.35 
Furthermore, judicial preview of the law and group action, albeit a weaker 
protection of constitutional rights requiring a “minimum” of housing, health 
care, inter alia, to be afforded by the government is a possible way to retain 
the values of constitutionalization while circumventing the difficulty facing the 
judiciary in deciding violations of individual claims.36 Judicial preview dictates 
that a matter is considered by the court not after a violation of a person’s rights 
has occurred, but rather before the matter arises in court—thereby covering all 
persons or groups entitled to the right. It is a proactive measure and 
necessitates an activist, creative, and innovative approach by the judiciary—by 
contrast to the process of judicial review, whereby the court plays its 
traditional responsive role and considers the aspect of a person’s right only 
after the violation has occurred. This form of judicial action retains the values 
of constitutionalization because it upholds the ‘minimum core’ requirement 
referred to in the preceding discussion and avoids the danger of compromise 
that comes with judicial review.Some might contend, however, that the alleged 
concerns over judicial capacity mask even deeper concerns. The skepticism 
surrounding judicial enforcement of ESCRs seemingly has more to do with 
                                                                                                                              
33 Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST 
APPLICATION 225 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. See G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current 
Dimensions, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (1991). See, e.g., Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 
986 Supp. S.C.C. 596 (1985) (India). See also Barse v. Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 596 (1986) 
(India) (stating that a wide mandate was given to an independent commission so as to enable 
maximum cooperation of all jails in their investigations); Navish, supra note 13. 
36 See generally JUDICIAL PROTECTION, supra note 2; GARGARELLA, supra note 1. 
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ideological concerns.37 Further, without legitimacy, the judiciary would be 
deterred from “tak[ing] the first steps”38 in building expertise that could lead to 
an enhancement of its capacity for adjudicating issues involving ESCRs.39 
While these arguments appear reasonable, they do not directly respond to the 
concerns of competence raised supra part B. They must not be dismissed, 
however, as they strengthen the “direct” responses to the concerns raised. 
Furthermore, skeptics raise another serious concern: the “polycentric”40 
nature of disputes that is characteristic of ESCRs cases. Some believe that the 
reason for this lies in the nature of the character of the litigation framework,41 
where “certain kinds of human relations are not appropriate raw material for a 
process of decision that is institutionally committed to acting on the basis of 
reasoned argument.”42 The fact that dispute adjudication is subject to 
adversarial proceedings that do not adapt well to decision making on 
polycentric issues43—and how all persons are likely to be affected—cannot be 
gathered before the court.44 These concerns have been allayed by new, creative 
judicial models in countries like India, where the Supreme Court has 
developed the model of Public Interest Litigation and Special Commissions;45 
the former model of judicial preview creates an enabling environment for 
consideration of the implications of decisions beyond parties appearing before 
the court, and the latter model facilites an inquisitorial-type of judicial 
                                                            
37 See JUDICIAL PROTECTION, supra note 2; GARGARELLA, supra note 1. 
38 Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 25. 
39 Id. 
40 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978). 
See also Liebenberg, supra note 32. 




45 Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 574–75 (1985); Pieris, supra note 35. See generally 
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS  (Benedetto Conforti & 
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) (exploring ways in which domestic courts are dealing with 
international human rights issues).  
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proceedings. Though the desirability of each of these methods is not without 
challenge,46 the point being made here is that if the judiciary has to, it is 
capable of adopting such creative models in new situations as the need arises. 
The concern regarding polycentricity requires a response. First, “the 
pervasiveness of polycentricity”47 has been widely accepted48 as relevant to all 
disputes, including those involving civil and political rights.49 Second, since 
this criticism goes to the root of the nature of the dispute and not to the nature 
of the adjudicating body; it does not mean that the executive branch or the 
legislative branch are in a better position to make such decisions when 
compared to the judiciary.50 Third, despite Fuller’s assertion that contrary 
evidence does not weaken his theory, there is increasing resistance to such a 
view.51 Perhaps what is required then is a “more sophisticated analysis of 
judicial competence”52 as adopted in the United States, or, alternatively, 
“refining the doctrine to render it more consistent with the role of courts in 
contemporary society”53 before further reliance is placed on this theory as a 
means to justify a restrained attitude for the judiciary.54 
C. Final Thoughts 
The first part of the article has examined two of the main criticisms leveled 
against the justiciability of ESCRs by deconstructing several facets that each 
embraces. It has demonstrated that such objections no longer stand up in the 
                                                            
46 Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: a critical review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 7–
10 (2009). 
47 Jeff A. King, The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity, Pub. L. 101–124 (2008). 
48 Id.; Pieterse, supra note 11, at 12–14. See generally Dennis M. Davis, The case against 
the inclusion of Socio-economic demands in a Bill of Rights as Directive Principles, 8 S. 
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 475 (1992). 
49 Pieterse, supra note 11, at 12–14. 
50 Id.. 
51 See King, supra note 47 (noting that Lon Fuller is a theorist on polycentricity and arguing 
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face of the many recent developments and persuasive counterarguments 
explored. Taking the debate one step further, this article suggests that the 
development of new phenomena has a double bearing on the debate of 
justiciability: first, by having a chilling effect on the objections to ESCRs and 
thereby further weakening the skeptics’ case, and second, by contributing to a 
“changed landscape” for the judicial enforcement of ESCRs. This is not to 
suggest that a new landscape displaces the former, but rather that it alters the 
backdrop within which the debate has hitherto been located. 
PART 2: A CHANGED LANDSCAPE FOR THE JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF ESCRS—IDENTIFYING CONTRIBUTING FACTORS  
 A. A New Constitutional Order 
A recent and growing trend in many states has been the incorporation of 
ESCRs into national constitutions. This trend saw a related growth in the 
enforcement of ESCRs, both in national jurisdictions  and regional systems. 
The trend experienced “an astonishingly rapid transition to what may be called 
‘juristocracy,’ . . . where constitutional reform has transferred an 
unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to 
judiciaries.”55 The emergence of this new constitutional approach, however, 
has manifested itself in three distinct traditions. First, that ESCRs are purely 
aspirational and should not be included as concrete constitutional provisions; 
second, that they should be embodied in the constitution but with a limited, 
conservative function of being non-justiciable guiding principles of state 
policy; and third, the more progressive approach of being incorporated as 
specific rights capable of judicial adjudication.56 
                                                            
55 HIRSCHL, supra note 27, at 1. 
56 See generally Albie Sachs, The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: The 
Grootboom Case, in DEMOCRATISING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 131 (Peris Jones & Kristian Stokke eds., 2005). 
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While academics strenuously contest the desirability of incorporating 
ESCRs into constitutions, 57 judicial review may be seen to promote rather than 
offend the notion of democracy through the protection of politically powerless 
groups.58 It gives a voice to the voiceless so that when their ESCRs have been 
violated, they can bring their grievances to court; they have an avenue to 
address their grievances, and the judiciary fills a void by empowering them. 
The desirability of including ESCRs in constitutional documents also varies 
with geopolitical context. In the West, this might not be problematic or 
harmful. In the East, conversely, constitutionalization of ESCRs “is a large 
mistake, possibly a disaster” because the countries are transitioning from 
communism to a market economy.59 Transition states are undergoing changes 
structurally and substantively, and many will seek to change or enact new 
constitutions that keep with the ideologies towards which they aspire. Further, 
the exclusion of these rights from a nation’s constitution shuts out the 
possibility of judicial efforts to rectify structural social, economic, and cultural 
inequalities, particularly in hesitant and timid judicial cultures. On the other 
hand, non-inclusion of rights might not deter an activist judiciary from 
initiating or challenging action on behalf of marginalized individuals or 
groups. Nevertheless, the incorporation of such rights in constitutions as 
directive principles of state policy as enforceable rights adds legitimacy to 
judiciaries that aim to enforce them. 
                                                            
57 Frank I. Michelman, Socio-Economic rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America 
Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 3–6 (2008) (discussing whether non-inclusion in actual fact 
makes a difference in the American context given the welfare obligations and undertakings 
of the government. Further, it looks at reasons why such rights should or should not be 
included in the U.S. Constitution). See generally Sunstein, supra note 33; FABRE, SOCIAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 20; Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and 
Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 451 (1992); Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a 
Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464 
(1992); HIRSCHL, supra note 27; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
CONSTITUTIONS DO 222 (2001). 
58 Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 137. 
59 Sunstein, supra note 33, at 225. 
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Skeptics are concerned that constitutionalization of ESCRs detracts attention 
from the main purpose of a constitution: to protect civil liberties and regulate 
between the different branches of government. When citizens assert their 
rights, the corresponding obligations of the state are engaged (i.e. to protect 
civil and political liberties), and thereby citizens are protected from 
oppression.60 An oppressive government typically denies people their liberties 
of free speech and movement. It takes steps to prevent the depressing 
eventuality where people have their civil liberties protected, but their basic 
needs are unmet—therefore preventing them from enjoying the former.61 
A closely related phenomenon to the constitutionalization of social rights is 
the “judicialization of politics.” This concept has been described as the 
infusion of judicial decision-making and of court-like procedures into new 
political arenas.62 The constitutionalization of ESCRs is also said to have 
political consequences through what has been termed the “global expansion of 
judicial power.”63 This phenomenon too does not escape the discussion on 
judicial involvement in ESCRs, but contributes to the changing landscape in 
the judicial enforcement of ESCRs.64 For better or for worse, the expansion of 
judicial power will shape global politics and policy for the foreseeable future. 
Recent practice, some argue, shows a movement toward government by the 
judiciary—where the judicial arm of the state governs and seems to hold the 
greatest decision-making power—as opposed to total majoritarianism—where 
a numerical majority in parliament or the executive make decisions for the 
entire country with all its peoples.65 Notwithstanding the normative 
justifications advanced for or against the incorporation of ESCRs into national 
                                                            
60 Id. at 222. 
61 Id. 
62 TORBJÖRN VALLINDER, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 515–16 (C. Neal 
Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1997). 
63 Id. See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 27, at 31 (discussing of the impacts and effects on 
democratic rule as a result of this trend which has been set afoot by the incorporation of such 
rights in the Constitution). 
64 See VALLINDER, supra note 62. 
65 Id. 
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constitutions, this phenomenon affects judicial power and alters the landscape 
for the debate on the judicial enforcement of ESCRs. 66 
“The belief that judicially affirmed rights are a force of social change 
removed from the constraints of political power has attained near sacred status 
in public discussion.”67 Thus, the new constitutional order that embraces the 
constitutionalization of ESCRs has shifted the debate from the traditional 
concerns of whether ESCRs ought to be the subject of judicial adjudication to 
what extent the judiciary should be empowered to intervene. 
B. Transnational Judicial Conversations 
Transnational judicial conversations signal new possibilities for the 
judiciary’s ability to enforce ESCRs. The conversations provide an additional 
avenue of enrichment for the “judicial project” by creating a channel for the 
exchange and sharing of its judicial knowledge and expertise, skills, and 
substantive jurisprudence. Transnational judicial conversations have been 
described as “worldwide dialogue”68 where the “courts are talking to one 
another all over the world.”69  Their relevance and prospects for the future only 
signal an increase in momentum, one in which soon “no lawyer will be able to 
advise a client on any matter which might involve a public authority without 
studying not just the European jurisprudence, . . . but also American case law, 
Canadian case law, and even Indian case law and Australian and New Zealand 
case law.”70 
                                                            
66 See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 27. 
67 Id. at 1. 
68 SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
214 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000). 
69 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 
99, 99 (1994) 
70 Lord Scarman, Human Rights Bill, 582 HL Debs. 1268 (Nov. 1997), available at 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1997/nov/03/human-rights-bill-hl. 
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Not surprisingly, however, this phenomenon elicits concerns, both in terms 
of trend and appropriateness.71 For instance, some have expressed concern 
about the superimposition of the United States and British reasoning into 
Indian courts, which are very different from each other.72 While 
acknowledging the logic expressed in this view, however, this practice should 
not be abandoned completely on this ground alone, as there are nations that do 
in fact share similar, comparable realities.73 The occasion when the practice 
does not suit the comparable realities of another jurisdiction and context 
simply does not justify a wholesale abandonment of the practice. 
International human rights and legal scholars like Geraldine van Bueren 
argue that the lack of jurisprudence in the international sphere could be cited as 
one of the reasons for the absence of rich and robust jurisprudence on ESCRs 
in domestic legal systems.74 This philosophy becomes obvious when 
contrasted with the robustness of jurisprudence in civil and political rights.75 
Accordingly, I predict that rich jurisprudence on ESCRs developed regionally 
and internationally would undoubtedly be a useful guide to judges in domestic 
national courts. 
At this juncture, three developments are relevant to mention. First, the 
European Court of Human Rights adopted the Optional Protocol, which has 
                                                            
71 SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, supra note 68, at 66. See generally Slaughter, supra note 
69; Mark V. Tushnet, The Possibilities of Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1226 (1999); 
Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transjudicial Discourse, 2 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 91 (2004); V.R. Krishna Iyer, Judge, Supreme Court of India, Inaugural 
Address at the Second State Lawyers’ Conference (Jan. 3, 1976), available at 
http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/76v2a1.htm. 
72 Iyer, supra note 71 (“Free India has to find its conscience in our rugged realities—and no 
more in alien legal thought”). 
73 Geraldine Van Bueren, Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court, 15 S. AFR. 
J. HUM. RTS. 74, 65–70 (1999). See also David Nelken, Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: 
An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUDIES 435, 440 (1995) (“We necessarily have the sense 
of living in an interdependent global system marked by borrowing and lending across porous 
cultural boundaries, and that Human Rights is one of the areas of law with the greatest ability 
to travel.”). 
74 Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 58. See generally Nelken, supra note 73. 
75 Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 65. See generally Nelken, supra note 73. 
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taken us one step closer to achieving an international forum for development of 
ESCR jurisprudence. Although this process will take time, its potential should 
not be disregarded.  
Second, we are witnessing the slow emergence of ESCR jurisprudence in 
regional human rights bodies—for instance, with the indirect protection 
accorded to socio-economic rights by the European Courts of Human Rights.76 
The merits of such indirect protection are topics for separate discussion. This 
trend in regional human rights bodies relates to the socio-economic rights and 
has contributed to the changed landscape.  
Third, transnational judicial conversations are beginning to alter the 
landscape of the judicial enforcement of ESCRs as applied by the judiciary in 
countries throughout the world. For example, South African judges are 
“empowered, although not obligated, to consider foreign law, which includes 
foreign legal approaches, but where the provisions of the South African Bill of 
Rights replicates Indian Constitutional provisions, the South African 
Constitutional Court is under a greater duty to consider Indian 
jurisprudence.”77 The reverse is also true. In the recent Indian case of Kuldip 
Nayar v. Union of India,78 substantial engagement is seen with the reasoning of 
the South African case of SACC New National Part of South Africa v. 
Government of Republic of South Africa and Aeronautica Nazionale 
Repubblicana,79 and the decision in United Democratic Movement v. President 
of the Republic of South Africa.80 
Does the phenomenon of transnational judicial conversations contribute to 
strengthening the legitimacy of judicial involvement in ESCRs? The answer to 
                                                            
76 EVA BREMS, EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross eds., 
2007). 
77 Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 68. See also Nelken, supra note 73. 
78 See, e.g., Nayar v. Union of India, 7 S.C.C. 1 (2006) (India). 
79 See, e.g., SACC New National Party of South Africa v. Government of Republic of South 
Africa and Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana 1999 (3) SA (CC) at 191 (S. Afr.). 
80 See, e.g., United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
2003 (1) S.A. 495 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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this question could be “yes” because such a system will go some distance in 
alleviating longstanding concerns that judges operate in a vacuum.81 For 
example, this could be done by facilitating a system of exchange and sharing 
of judicial expertise and skills, thereby ensuring that the judiciary is in fact 
subject to external influences (i.e., the legal reasoning employed by other 
courts in similar situations). Drawing on international and regional 
jurisprudence might aid judges in their day-to-day affairs, lend legitimacy to 
their decisions, and therefore generate greater acceptance of their decisions. 
This argument might, however, also be viewed with suspicion. Can it truly 
be external when this “conversation” remains within the judicial fraternity?82 
Each country has its own judicial culture, and the influence from another 
jurisdiction does in fact become external, which can prove to be a positive 
practice in its neutralization of any inherent prejudices. Moreover, “the 
jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts in other jurisdictions is a useful source 
of guidance to any judge seeking to give meaning to a human rights 
instrument.”83 Finally, so long as there are other methods and mechanisms in 
place to facilitate representation of marginalized groups in decision making 
and their participation, transnational judicial conversations can advance the 
legitimacy of the courts in enforcement of ESCRs. 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the entry of the phenomenon of 
transnational judicial conversations into the domain of ESCRs, both indirectly 
through regional jurisprudence and directly in constitutions. First, this has 
altered the backdrop of the debate on justiciability of ESCRs. Second, it 
answered the question of whether this trend can be used to strengthen the case 
that ESCRs are not justiciable on grounds of capacity and legitimacy. Third, 
the emergence of this phenomenon led to a changed role for judges in the 
                                                            
81 See Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 137 (describing this as “cold halls of an 
institution far removed from the pulse of the nation.”). 
82 See generally Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 499 (2000). 
83 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Activism & Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretive Process, 4 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 350, 355 (1999). 
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enforcement of ESCRs. Finally, it can have a significant impact on the debate 
of justiciability of ESCRs. This issue is important to consider in the context of 
the judicial enforcement of ESCRs. 
C. Institutional Dialogue84 
The definition of “constitutional dialogue”85 advanced by Luc Trembley, a 
scholar who has contributed to the development of the concept of 
‘constitutional dialogue,’ embraces the proposition that this phenomenon can 
be used to allay concerns over the legitimacy of judicial involvement.86 He 
defines “institutional dialogue” as essentially a process whereby executives 
and legislatures “participate in a dialogue aimed at achieving the proper 
balance between constitutional principles and public policies and the existence 
of this dialogue constitutes a good reason for not conceiving of judicial review 
as democratically illegitimate.”87 To begin a debate on which organ of 
government is superior to another is a futile exercise.88 If the criteria ought to 
be election to office, the executive should be an equally autonomous sovereign 
to Parliament; thereby defeating the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty.89 An 
examination of government systems like the bicameral legislature of the 
                                                            
84 For the purposes of the present discussion, “constitutional dialogue” and “institutional 
dialogue” are used interchangeably. 
85 See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell Thornton, Charter Dialogue between Courts 
and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All) 35 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 81 (1997). For other theories of institutional dialogue from the lens 
of constitutionalism, see Kent Roach, Constitution and Common Law Dialogue Between the 
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 481 (2006); KENT ROACH, 
THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (Irwin 
Law ed., 2001); Kent Roach, Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court 
Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 347 (2006) (discussing the 
merits for constitutional dialogue in situations where there are overriding and limitation 
clauses in countries such as Canada, when compared to the United States, where this has not 
been possible). 
86 Luc B. Tremblay, Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts 
and Legislatures, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 617, 622–23 (2005). 
87 Id. at 617. See Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12. 
88 See Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12. 
89 See id. 
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United Kingdom’s Parliament as one constituting an unelected House of Lords 
disproves the idea of Parliament’s sovereignty because at least one section of 
the British parliamentary system is not elected.90 Therefore, the real debate 
should be about legitimacy and constitutional principles91 and not about which 
organ of government is superior to another. 
The United Kingdom demonstrates that parliamentary sovereignty can also 
affront the rule of law and ultra vires. By being supreme and sovereign—and 
therefore ‘above the law’—it violates the notion of rule of law where all 
entities are considered subject to it. Furthermore, the critics of judicial review 
who argue that it is an affront to the rule of law can be defeated by their own 
argument.92 The debate on judicial review has not been focused on the issue of 
legitimacy.93 Rather, the critics of ultra vires welcomed and praised the 
contribution of the common law.94 Hence, common law stands as a testament 
to the fact that judges do in fact make law. In the words of Lord Reid: “There 
was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make 
law—they only declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have 
thought that in some Aladdin’s cave there is hidden the common law in all its 
splendor and that on a judge’s appointment there descends on him knowledge 
of the magic words Open Sesame. . . . But we do not believe in fairy tales 
anymore.”95 
The concept of dialogue, as suggested by Allan, has been subject to 
skepticism.96 Judicial responsibility, Tremblay97 argues, requires judges to be 
                                                            
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 22, 22 (1972); 
H.W.R. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 78 (1989) (“[J]udges are up to their 
necks in policy, as they have been all through history”); Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban 
District Council, 1 QB 373, 391 (1972) (“In the end, it will be found to be a question of 
policy, which we, as judges, have to decide.”). 
96 Tremblay, supra note 86, at 622–23 (arguing that the type of dialogue described as 
granting legitimacy to judicial review “does not and cannot exist,” though he recognizes that 
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loyal to their decisions and willing to justify them through concrete 
reasoning.98 He claims that this is incompatible with the formulation of the 
“dialogue as deliberation” model, which calls for flexibility on the part of 
judges even to the point of being willing to change their position on a matter.99 
He declares that judges must not “subordinate their own convictions and 
practical judgments to the will or judgments of others.”100 Can we argue that 
the “dialogue as deliberation” model advocates rational persuasion and not 
coercion? Can we not contend that when a judge begins to retreat from a 
previously held position through genuine agreement and conviction, it is not 
“subordination”? Should not the “supremacy of reason”101 be the ultimate 
winner in such a situation? When a judge’s original view has been displaced 
willingly and voluntarily by another view, is it subordination? Perhaps it is 
possible that the argument of incompatibility has discrepancies. Perhaps 
Tremblay’s charge of incompatibility becomes relevant only in a situation 
where a judge is forced to change his or her mind against his or her will. 
Nevertheless, requiring judges to not change their minds is to assume that 
judges are the best decision makers.102 Tremblay takes the argument one step 
further by construing “justification” by the judiciary of their decisions as a 
                                                                                                                              
there is some dialogue taking place). Tremblay introduces two definitions of dialogue, 
namely, “dialogue as deliberation” and “dialogue as conversation.” He argues that the former 
is the type that would be successful in lending legitimacy to judicial review. He claims, 
however, that this model is not compatible with the notion of judicial responsibility, which 
he argues is inextricably linked with the rule of law and essence of judicial function. Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 635. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 634. 
101 Trevor R.S. Allan, Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’, 65 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 671, 694 (2006) (“A ‘legal culture of justification’ demands the supremacy 
of reason; and reason is persuasive argument, closely tailored to the circumstances of the 
particular case in question.”) [hereinafter Allan, Human Rights]. 
102 See generally Richard Ekins, Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 119 L.Q. REV. 127 
(2003) (demonstrating how the judicial function is better for interpreting rather than making 
the law). 
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means of making the judiciary “subordinate” to the legislature.103 However, 
this is a dangerous proposition to make since it might allow judges to operate 
in a vacuum and not be held accountable to the legislature. Ultimately, this 
result runs counter to the purpose of the judicial role because it would threaten 
the legitimacy of the judicial function.104 
The preceding discussion illustrates the fact that the concept of institutional 
dialogue brings legitimacy to the judicial enterprise. It also demonstrates how 
it can counter the claim that judicial enforcement of ESCRs violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers by arguing for a balance of power, rather than 
the traditional notion of a strict separation of powers.105 Therefore, it is not true 
that it lacks legitimacy. The notion of “institutional dialogue” considered by 
Allan suggests a changed role for the judiciary.106 He proposes a role defined 
less as one where the judiciary merely fills legal spaces or gaps, but rather as 
one that takes on a more positive flavor based on the notion of “shared 
sovereignty”107 in a “more formal sense”108 where “authority is divided.”109 
Hence, under this perspective, the role of the court is one that ought to be more 
than simply picking up the missing pieces to finish off the work of the 
legislature. It suggests a far more proactive and meaningful presence for the 
                                                            
103 Tremblay, supra note 86, at 634–35. 
104 Allan, Human Rights, supra note 101, at 695 (“By forestalling or curtailing such 
argument, a doctrine of deference threatens to displace law and reason, strictly applied, by 
expediency and arbitrariness.”). 
105 Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12, at 563 (“There must be a balance of power 
between law-giver and interpreter, maintained by judgments of political morality rather than 
formal accounts of the separation of powers.”); Pieterse, supra note 11, at 404 (arguing that 
inter alia, in the wake of the new formulation for the doctrine of separation of powers 
envisaged by the South African Bill of Rights together with the prevalence of a diluted or 
different conception of democracy, it would be counterproductive to keep lamenting this fact 
by pretending that it is still threatening); see also Part 1; Allan, Human Rights, supra note 
101. 
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judiciary; one which the judiciary has shown to be capable of sustaining. This 
perspective calls for a reconceptualization of the judicial role. 
D. Final Thoughts 
The second part of the article sought to advance the argument of a “changed 
landscape” that has confronted the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs by 
identifying prevalent phenomena, which are on the rise in several different 
regions of the world. The set of phenomena explored in this chapter is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list.110 Instead, the three examples provided 
directly and substantially bear on the debate. This section demonstrates how 
these phenomena go to the heart of the debate on the judicial role. Moreover, 
these debates are predicted to escalate and should by no means be ignored. 
Further, although each has a significant bearing on the debate, the 
interaction and close interplay will likely impact the context of the judicial 
enforcement of ESCRs such that the effect of the sum is greater than its parts. 
This part of the article served two primary purposes. First, it further weakened 
the skeptics’ case. Secondly, it demonstrated that the changed context for the 
judicial enforcement of ESCRs is a reality that has resulted in the need for 
reconsideration of the judicial role. 
                                                            
110 There was a renewed interest and momentum in the establishment of freedom from 
poverty as a human right, as evidenced by the development of the Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor (LEP) approach to dealing with poverty and further the setting up of the Committee 
on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) in 2005. See Dan Banik, Legal 
Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty Eradiction, 1 HAGUE J. 
RULE L. 117, 117 (2009). See, e.g., Matthew Stephens, The Commission on Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed, 1 HAGUE J. RULE L. 132,  (2009). See 
also Stephen Golub, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: One Big Step 
Forward and A Few Steps Back for Development Policy and Practice, 1 HAGUE J. RULE L. 
101 (2009); LAW AND POVERTY: THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND POVERTY REDUCTION  (Lucy 
Williams et al. eds., 2004). Yet another factor that might be seen as contributing to the 
changed landscape to the debate on justiciability of ESCR is the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol and the potential impact it has on the justiciability debate if and when it is 
instituted. See Part 1. 
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II. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
This section examines the role that the judiciary plays in the wake of the 
proposed “changed landscape” that emerged as a result of the weakened 
skepticism in the justiciable nature of ESCRs and the corresponding “rise” of 
phenomena. This discussion addresses the inherent limitations in such a 
judicial role. The aim of this part of the article, however, is not to focus on the 
shortcomings of the judiciary, but rather to demonstrate how the judiciary can 
in fact contribute to the implementation of ESCRs. 
Several aspects of the United Nations’ framework governing judicial 
conduct reinforces arguments advanced in parts 1 and 2 of this article while at 
the same time rendering direct legitimacy to judicial involvement in the 
domain of enforcing ESCRs. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of 
2006 recalled the need for member states “to achieve international cooperation 
in promoting and encouraging human rights and fundamental ‘principles.’”111 
The development of the trend of transnational judicial conversations112 gains 
legitimacy from this provision of the ECOSOC by arguing that it facilitates 
meeting the requirement of “international cooperation” in the field of human 
rights adjudication by setting in motion avenues for the sharing of mutually 
enriching bodies of jurisprudence. Thus, in addition to the legitimacy derived 
from national constitutions—such as the South African constitution—this 
principle of judicial conduct might also be used to justify and legitimize a 
judge’s substantive engagement with relevant international human rights 
jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the ECOSOC upholds “the importance of a competent”113 
judiciary. The ECOSOC’s conclusions reinforce the need for competence in 
matters under adjudication that go so far as to require judges not only “to 
                                                            
111 U.N. Economic & Social Council, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct: 
Strengthening the Principles of Judicial Conduct (2006), available at  
http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/documents/2006/resolutions/Resolution%202006-23.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
112 See Part 2. 
113 U.N. Economic & Social Council, supra note 111. 
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maintain and enhance . . . knowledge, skills, and personal qualities necessary 
for the proper performance of judicial duties,”114 but also to be “subject to 
suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity . . . that render them unfit 
to discharge their duties.”115 
The ECOSOC also recognizes that “judges are accountable for their conduct 
to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards which are 
themselves independent and impartial.”116 This recognition allays the concern 
that judges are free from any accountability,117 although the lack of the 
“public” dimension of accountability might remain contested. 
These provisions have value in that they create international standards for 
the government of the judiciary. However, while these standards have general 
applicability, it must be borne in mind that it is neither desirable nor feasible to 
have a single “formula” or a “one-size-fits-all” approach for the judicial role; 
to do so would negate the varying legal and political realities of each 
country.118 Thus, it is useful to consider the problems any country envisaging 
the “constitutionalization” of ESCRs and the consequent protection by the 
judiciary would need to address because there is a core set of factors that 
would need to be addressed in any context.119 
The following section attempts to carve out a judicial role in relation to 
ESCRs. It will embrace a three-pronged approach to examine the function of 
the judiciary in three areas where it is most active and most contested: namely, 
interpreting the meaning of ESCRs, judicial review of executive action, and 
the provision of remedies. 
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115 Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles on 
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A. Interpreting the Meaning of ESCRs 
Fabre, an international commentator who has addressed the constitutional 
dimensions of social rights comprehensively, argues that the ESCR trainings 
prescribed for judges are deficient in that they only present a “piecemeal”120 
perspective on the execution of social rights and do not embrace the holistic 
view of a government’s duty, which is essential to this function of 
interpretation.121 This argument, though reasonable, does not seem to take into 
account the merits of effecting “constitutional dialogue” between the three 
organs of government.122 Though such dialogue might not completely assuage 
this concern, it provides some clarity as to what the executive intends by 
facilitating a cooperative relationship between the three organs of democratic 
government. 
Fabre’s second argument holds more ground; he laments the “reactive” 
nature of adjudication whereby the government performs its duty only after a 
case is brought to court and “once harm is [already] done.”123 This concern 
might also be refuted through the practice of “judicial preview”124: where the 
laws are assessed for congruence with principles of legality, legitimacy, and 
natural justice prior to implementation; where the Constitutional Court issues 
decisions that will be applicable to the entire group or individuals falling 
within the ambit of the particular law in question, as opposed to consideration 
of implications of the law for the one individual case before it.125 Fabre 
observes, however, that the system of judicial preview ensures that government 
policy is not over-simplified by consideration through the perspective of one 




122 See Part 2. 
123 FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 270. 
124 Id. at 283. 
125 See id. See generally And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the 
Separation of Powers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1996); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 439 (1989). 
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the original intent of the government policy.126 Additionally, the concept of 
judicial preview does not address the situation where incompatibility of law 
with constitutional provisions is seen only after the violation.127 Thus, a 
possible solution would be to allow both systems, namely, judicial review, 
which is the judicial capacity to review the soundness of lower court decisions, 
and judicial preview, to be at the disposal of the judiciary and to be utilized 
depending on the nature of the case before the court. 
Similarly, the proactive approach taken by courts such as the Supreme Court 
of India has helped meet some of the shortfalls of excluding victims who 
remain anonymous to a court. Moreover, it has changed the model of Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL), which is litigation in protection of the public that is 
introduced in a court of law by the court itself or by a third party; it is not 
necessary that the victim of the violation personally approach the court.128 
However, scholars like David Bilchitz129 and Rosalind Dixon130 defend and 
even advocate a role for judges in filling in “blind spots”131 of law in order to 
better protect the interests of minorities and unseen members of a society. It is 
important, however, for the judiciary to ground its decisions in legitimate legal 
ideals, otherwise it may face abstraction and ultimate collapse.132 
This would best be highlighted if we imagine a judiciary in the United States 
that decided to stop working inside the framework of the US Constitution. 
Consider a situation where the courts no longer looked to legitimate legal 
                                                            
126 See FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 20. 
127 FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 20. 
128 Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 
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ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 135–234 (2007). 
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principles such as the US Constitution in determining their cases. Without this 
framework of legitimacy, the court would face constant criticism and 
invalidation, and eventually collapse. Several judicial models133 of 
interpretation, such as those of “reasonableness,” “dignity-equality-freedom,” 
and “equality,” have been devised as tools to aid judges in defining the scope 
and ambit for ESCRs.134 The ultimate goal is to create a model that facilitates a 
socially transformative judicial role that is also legitimatized through 
practically application. The models discussed above highlight the way in 
which the courts are capable of ingenuity and creativity despite debate over the 
best method to reach this goal. 
The judiciary’s role in the enforcement of norms is clearly compatible with 
its traditional function and still subject to the same methods of accountability. 
The International Commission of Jurists is explicit about the judges’ 
interpretative role in ESCRs: “In cases when different legal interpretations are 
possible, . . . assigning judges a role in the enforcement of these norms is 
absolutely compatible with the traditional function performed by the 
judiciary.”135 However, giving courts the right to be the final authority on the 
scope and ambit of rights136 is not to say that their powers are unfettered. 
Frameworks of judicial conduct that limit unfettered judicial discretion in 
carrying out this function have been laid down and need to be looked upon 
                                                            
133 See generally BILCHITZ, supra note 129 (examining the merits and shortfalls of each 
model); Aarthi Belani, The South African Constitutional Court’s Decision in TAC: A 
“Reasonable” Choice?, (Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Series, Working Paper No. 7, 2004) (discussing the merits and shortfalls of 
reasonableness standard). 
134 See Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socio-Economic Rights: Strong Form 
Versus Weak Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 391–418 (2007). 
135 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, COURTS AND THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, 
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(2008). 
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fairly.137  These frameworks maintain the legitimacy of the judiciary’s 
interpretations and conduct. 
A more tempered view is that judges should be seen only as contributing 
to—and not enjoying—the sole prerogative in this interpretative duty. The 
judiciary’s duty should be one of “assisting other branches of government.”138 
Through this approach, a spirit of “inter-institutional cooperative 
interaction”139 could be built without losing sight of the court’s duty to 
promote “human dignity, [equality] and freedom” through rights 
adjudication.140 
B. Judicial Review 
Part of the court’s interpretative role is the duty of review that arises when a 
party alleges non-compliance by the state. This alleged non-compliance often 
involves violation of ESCRs through the state’s actions in a case brought 
before the court. The more judicial review is restrained and restricted through 
high burdens of proof or limited access for those whose ESCRs are violated, 
the more there are concerns about judicial incapacity and lack of legitimacy.141 
All that judges can do in a restrained judicial system is to make a 
determination as to whether standards in the constitution are adhered to in 
formulating budgets.142 The original decision on making budgets is left to the 
elected organs of government.143 Therefore, it is arguable that merely because 
cases like Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
“may have budgetary implications, . . . courts are not themselves directed at 
                                                            
137 Pieterse, supra note 11, at 24–40. 
138 Id. at 27–28; Geraldine van Bueren, Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court, 
15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 52, 64–65 (1999). 
139 Pieterse, supra note 11, at 28. 
140 Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational 
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. 
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rearranging budgets.”144 As writers like Pieterse, an author of leading works on 
ESCRs, observe, “the fact is that courts are not ill equipped to scrutinize or 
evaluate budgets or policies just because they are ill equipped to engage in 
budgetary or policy making.”145 In order to make such determinations, courts 
and elected bodies ought to formulate criteria for making judgments on 
budgetary issues.146 This will undoubtedly lend legitimacy to their verdicts on 
ESCR matters. 
Judicial review is justified on the grounds that judicial review is justified on 
the grounds of being valuable in terms of remedying violations of rights that 
are a consequence of undesirable governmental policy-making. It is by no 
means intended to displace and replace government policy making with 
judicial policy making.147 Further, the concept of “constitutional dialogue” 
could serve as a “middle ground” and is often used as a justification for 
legitimizing judicial review.148 Writers like Tushnet, a writer on the concepts 
of judicial review and preview as well as judicial systems generally, also 
support “weak-form review,”149 as it prevents the judiciary from encroaching 
into the policy-making domain of the elected branches of government.150  
I argue that “weak-form review” is the recommended approach for all types 
of rights since it acknowledges and balances two important factors: the 
vaguely defined right, on the other hand, is balanced with the judiciary’s 
construction of what the right ought to be, on the other.151 However, one must 
remember that this form of review is not always easy to sustain because it has  
the attendant danger of swinging to either extreme: where judges begin to 
                                                            
144 Id.; Pieterse, supra note 11, at 410 (citing Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment 
Action Campaign (No. 2) CCT8/02, 5 July 2002). 
145 Pieterse, supra note 11, at 29 (emphasis added). 
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make policy decisions through “strong form”152 judicial review, or where 
elected officials do not acknowledge the judicial role in such matters.153 The 
danger of a “slip down either side of the slope” could be mitigated by having 
the judiciary sensitized to such dangers, thereby raising awareness on the 
rightful limitations inherent in its role. 
C. Provision of Remedies 
There is no history or legacy of awarding remedies for violations of ESCRs. 
Some contend that it is in the awarding of remedies that the judiciary becomes 
most vulnerable to overstepping its mark.154  
In South Africa, for example,  courts are empowered with a broad mandate 
to award remedies.155 Section 38 of the South African Constitution (regarding 
the duty to provide “appropriate relief”) and Section 172(1)(b) (allowing the 
judiciary to “make any order that is just and equitable”) indicate considerable 
space for judicial discretion and innovation in the area of providing 
remedies.156 
The terms “appropriate” and “just and equitable” are inherently ambiguous. 
While tradition has granted the South African courts broad award powers, the 
language itself could be read either way. These words may be said to provide a 
framework within which decisions are to be made, and thus constrain judicial 
decision-making. However, as notions of “appropriateness” and “just and 
equitable” are all subjective, relative terms, judges do indeed have a broad 
“margin of appreciation” in making such decisions. 
Some controversy has existed regarding whether or not the judiciary should 
provide for “building an enforcement mechanism into the remedy awarded.”157  
Indeed, as the South African case of Government of the Republic of South 
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Africa v. Grootboom158 demonstrates, the court’s opinion once again goes to 
the heart of balancing interests of legal legitimacy with interests of 
effectiveness in enforcing ESCRs. 
Commentators in the justiciability of ESCRs such as scholar and 
commentator Marius Pieterse suggest further guidelines for judicial activity in 
this area. He argues for facilitating “inter-institutional interaction”159 through 
respecting the doctrine of separation of powers and designing creative 
remedies only in instances where traditional ones are ineffective.160 He argues 
that the remedies must be designed in such a way that they do not have far-
reaching implications on parties unconnected to a case.161 
A possible means of allowing a judicial role in this area while not 
encroaching on the mandate of the other organs of the state would be to send 
the statute back to the legislature for amendment, as in cases such as  
Grootboom.162 Writers like Bilchitz, a landmark scholar in the field of human 
rights protection and promotion, opt for rigorous review of what the right 
should entail and how speedily the right ought to be enforced and 
implemented.163 Conversely, Mureinik, a commentator in the field of human 
rights protection, argues that the standard of review by judges should be 
rational and sincere consideration before a court can send a statute back. A 
combination of both would be useful to the judges’ decision-making processes 
as each case might embrace a different set of realities. 
Bilchitz goes one step further in envisaging a situation where a verdict 
declaring no shortage of resources together with a lack of competing claims on 
                                                            
158 Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 1 S.A. 46 (S. Afr.). See 




162 Grootboom, 2000 1 S.A. 46. 
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case). 
The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 787 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
the same resources grants the judiciary the power to coerce the government to 
execute its duties.164 While it is tempting to employ such an approach as a 
means to protect citizens in the event of either arbitrary action or inaction by 
oppressive governments,165 it becomes problematic because it rests on the 
assumption that the judiciary is in the best position to make assessments on 
competing claims of resource allocations. Further, it carries with it an 
imminent danger of a situation where the judiciary is overseeing and dictating 
government’s day-to-day spending plans. Moreover, there is also the concern 
that the judiciary does not have a holistic view, but rather a “piecemeal” 
impression of government policy.166 It is in situations such as this that a 
healthy relationship of “constitutional dialogue” and understanding between 
the executive and judiciary becomes imperative.167 
The other situation to be considered is one where it is pronounced by the 
judiciary that the government has been erroneous in the apportioning of its 
resources. Here too, a budget might be sent back to the government for 
corrective action.168 While the arguments raised in part two are relevant here as 
well, assuming that such concerns are allayed,169 such an approach would not 
violate the doctrine of separation of powers so long as the details are left to be 
worked out by the organs generally responsible for budgetary decisions. This is 
an example of a situation where “weak-form” review becomes attractive. 
A useful approach for protecting the judiciary from sliding down the 
“slippery slope” toward policy making would be to mete out the requirement 
of having to stop at the point of a pronouncement of violation of the ESCR of 
the individual rather than merely providing reasons for what led them to arrive 
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at this decision.170 This approach would prevent the judiciary from being 
perceived as making veiled references to corrective action that the judiciary 
believes should be taken by the executive. 
Similarly, in the broader discussion on meaningful contributions of the 
judiciary in enforcing ESCRs it must be borne in mind that there are a range of 
factors171 that need to be considered. These include access to courts by 
marginalized and vulnerable groups and individuals, responsiveness of the 
courts to ESCR violations in general, and new situations where ESCRs are 
violated—in particular the implementation of court orders, and the response to 
orders by the larger public.172 
D. Final Thoughts 
Taking a moment to step back and observe the broader debate on what the 
approach of the judiciary has been,173 it is clear that the notion of what it ought 
to be174 is ripe for further discussion. Opinion is divided on which judicial 
approach is the most appropriate. One view is that the judiciary has been 
activist to a fault, while others argue that the judiciary has been too deferential 
                                                            
170 See ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN 
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(2008). 
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RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD  (Varun Gauri & Daniel Brinks eds., 2008); Carlo 
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to other governmental bodies.175 Yet another view is that a reasonable and 
balanced judicial approach is advisable; namely, one that is effective and 
makes a valuable contribution to the overall implementation of ESCRs. 
It appears, then, that the judiciary should be activist to the extent that it 
remains within the boundaries of its legitimacy and capability while at the 
same time being conscious of maintaining an effective presence in the overall 
implementation of ESCRs. Conversely, perhaps the judiciary should remain 
deferential to the extent that is required for it to maintain its legitimacy within 
the domain of its capability while not losing sight of contributing to the 
implementation of ESCRs. In other words, the judiciary should be activist 
enough to be effective and deferential enough not to raise concerns of 
legitimacy and capacity. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of judicially enforced ESCRs has raised new questions in the 
discussion of justiciability. However, as this article has shown, this is not to 
say that the original questions have been displaced and are henceforth 
irrelevant. Rather, it has revealed that the original questions require revisiting, 
but this time with a refocused lens necessitated by new developments that have 
a significant bearing on the original questions. 
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The article began with an examination of the question as to whether and to 
what extent the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs has been settled. Through 
a detailed examination of two of the more important objections leveled against 
the justiciability of ESCRs, this article exposed the weaknesses in the skeptics’ 
case. Furthermore, their case is weakened where judicial involvement is shown 
to have derived renewed strength from new constitutional conceptions of the 
separation of powers, new understandings of the notion of democracy, the 
practice of institutional dialogue between the judiciary and its elected 
counterparts, and finally, through the growing recourse to transnational judicial 
conversations.176 
This article has demonstrated that analogous to the rise of judicially 
enforced ESCRs, there has been a corresponding “rise” in new phenomena as 
presented in part two, which has changed the landscape within which the role 
of the judiciary has hitherto been located. 
Further, the article demonstrated in part three that this “changed landscape” 
has necessitated a reconsideration of the role of the judiciary. The 
reconceptualization of the judicial role has been carried out in the context of 
realizing the larger goal of contributing to the overall implementation of 
ESCRs. 
The article acknowledges the importance of the “dependent variables”177 in 
ensuring the overall effectiveness of the judicial role and though it has not 
been the subject of analysis in the present article, it must be flagged in view of 
its importance. 
Further study is needed into the intersectionality between the effectiveness 
of the judicial role and the dependent variables, with the aim of reducing this 
dependency. This need for further study is important in order to improve the 
perception of the potential contribution of the judiciary and to avoid situations 
where it might be used as an excuse for ineffectiveness or inertia on the part of 
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the judiciary. Further study would help to demonstrate how the judicial role 
can be effective without being dependent on the success and interaction of the 
dependent variables, and how the judicial role is not contingent or conditioned 
on these dependent variables for its success.  Instead, we should find a way of 
ensuring success of the role of dependent variables independently of external 
factors not within the courts’ control. 
Furthermore, the underlying suggestion of this article has been that 
successful enforcement of ESCRs does not automatically translate into a 
process of social transformation.178 There has been a slow emergence of 
academic thought and literature on the potential of courts in the area of social 
transformation. This also could be an area that is worthy of further exploration, 
albeit carefully.179 The reason for this caution is because the judiciary should 
not run the risk of spreading its effectiveness and contribution too thin so as to 
threaten its already secured role in the enforcement of ESCRs. 
Moreover, further research into the effect that the new set of phenomena 
herein described has on the ESCRs will be welcome in deepening our 
understanding. This is especially the case because some of these areas are new 
even in understanding their own conceptualization and functioning.  
Finally, the role of the judiciary should always remain effective in whatever 
it is conceived of as being legitimate and capable of doing. The judiciary 
should retain and build on its role in enforcing ESCRs. As long as this is 
achieved, it will keep the hopes of millions of vulnerable and marginalized 
communities and individuals the world over alive. 
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179 See id. 
